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Empirical evidence shows that entrepreneurs hold a large fraction of wealth, have higher
saving rates than workers, and face substantial uninsurable entrepreneurial and investment
risks. This paper constructs a heterogeneous-agent general equilibrium model with
uninsurable entrepreneurial risk and capital-market imperfections to explore the
implications of uninsurable entrepreneurial risk for wealth distribution and aggregate
activity in an incomplete market economy. It is shown that entrepreneurial risk can
substantially affect both the wealth distribution and the macroeconomy.
Keywords: Wealth Distribution, Idiosyncratic Entrepreneurial Risk, Incomplete Capital
Markets
1. INTRODUCTION
What role do uninsurable entrepreneurial risk and capital market imperfections
play in shaping the wealth distribution in the economy? What are the impacts of
ﬁnancial development on the level and volatility of aggregate output and capital?
In this paper, we construct a heterogeneous-agent dynamic stochastic general
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equilibrium model to address these important macroeconomic questions quantita-
tively.Themainfeaturesofthismodelarethatoccupationalchoiceisendogenous,
capital markets are incomplete in the sense that idiosyncratic risks cannot be fully
insured,andcontractsbetweenborrowersandlendersareimperfectlyenforceable.
The literature has typically found that simple models based on standard and
identical preferences and on uninsurable shocks to labor income cannot account
for the observed U.S. Gini coefﬁcient of 0.803 on wealth.1 For example, Aiyagari
(1994) ﬁnds considerably less wealth concentration in a model with only idiosyn-
craticlaborearningsuncertainty;KrusellandSmith(1998)ﬁndthesameinmodels
with both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Among the inﬁnite horizon models
that try to reproduce the wealth distribution in the U.S. data, two kinds of models
have performed well. One is the stochastic-β model by Krusell and Smith, which
achieves an improved ﬁt in the upper tail of the wealth distribution by assuming
that individual discount factors are idiosyncratic. The second is the model of
Casta˜ neda et al. (2003), which assumes extremely volatile uninsurable idiosyn-
cratic shocks to labor income. Both models achieve their better ﬁts by introducing
individual-speciﬁc exogenous disturbances, which arguably weakens the models
asexplanationsofthewealthdistribution.2 Thereasonthatthesemodelsdopoorly
in explaining the facts is that the only motive to save is precautionary: in order to
smooth consumption, agents build a buffer stock of wealth. However, as discussed
in the literature on precautionary savings, once the buffer has reached a certain
level, the incentive to save becomes weak. The introduction of life-cycle features,
as in Huggett (1996), increases the concentration of wealth as measured by the
Gini index. However, the life-cycle model generates this higher concentration of
wealth by increasing the proportion of households with zero or negative wealth,
rather than by generating a higher concentration at the top of the distribution.
Therefore, there must be other mechanisms inducing some agents to accumulate
and maintain very high levels of wealth.
Entrepreneurship has been recently used to study household savings, the distri-
bution of wealth, and social mobility; see Quadrani (2001), Fern´ andez-Villaverde
et al. (2003; henceforth FGC), Gentry and Hubbard (2004), and Cagetti and De
Nardi (2006). In the data, entrepreneurs are a small fraction of the population, but
have a high saving rate and hold a large share of total wealth. For instance, in the
1989 SCF, entrepreneurs are 8.7% of the sample, but hold 39% of total net worth.
Both Quadrini (2001) and Gentry and Hubbard (2004) document that the large
wealth holdings of entrepreneurs are due not only to the fact that entrepreneurs
earn more income, but also to their saving a larger fraction of their income than
nonentrepreneurs. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) is another inﬂuential work. They
show that wealthier people are more inclined to become entrepreneurs because of
liquidityconstraints:capitalisessentialforstartingaﬁrm,andliquidityconstraints
tend to exclude those with insufﬁcient funds at their disposal. It will be shown that
our quantitative results can also conﬁrm their empirical result.
The model in this paper is constructed along the line of heterogeneous-agent
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studied in FGC (2003). In FGC (2003), the interest and wage rates are set ex-
ogenously in solving individuals’ optimization problems; in other words, their
model cannot generate the equilibrium interest and wage rates. In contrast, in this
paper, we assume that there are two production sectors (the corporate sector and
the entrepreneur sector) and the interest and wage rates can be determined by the
productionofthecorporatesectorinequilibrium.Thisnovelfeature,togetherwith
other features such as uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, occupational choices, and
capital market imperfections, makes our model more difﬁcult to solve because
the equilibrium factor prices now depend on both aggregate capital stock and ag-
gregate labor employment in the corporate sector, which are not simple functions
of a known moment of the distribution, as they depend on the current optimal
decisions of all entrepreneurs and workers. Therefore, we need to add some extra
steps to guarantee that all markets are clear and all households know the current
factor prices before they make decisions.
After calibrating and solving our benchmark model, we ﬁnd that the model can
generate the wealth distribution observed in the U.S. data. Furthermore, we show
that due to uninsurable entrepreneurial risks and capital market imperfections,
agents choose to save more to undertake entrepreneurial activity. Finally, we ﬁnd
that the economy with more volatile entrepreneurial risks generates greater wealth
inequality. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we characterize the
model economy. In Section 3, we characterize households’ optimization problems
anddeﬁnetherecursivecompetitiveequilibrium.InSection4,wesettheparameter
values and present main ﬁndings. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE MODEL ECONOMY
The model economy is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived households
measured by 1. In each period, every household makes a decision to establish
or run its own business (be an entrepreneur) or to be a worker who supplies
his or her labor to the competitive labor market. There are three sectors in the
model: the household sector, the production sectors (the corporate and noncorpo-
rate/entrepreneurial sectors), and the ﬁnancial intermediation sector. The workers
face partially uninsurable labor income risk, and the entrepreneurs face idiosyn-
cratic uninsurable entrepreneurial risk. There is one ﬁnal good that can be used
either for consumption or for capital services. The timing of the economy is as
follows: (i) At the beginning of each period, different idiosyncratic shocks are
realized; (ii) then, the households will produce according to their occupational
choices made in the previous period to be entrepreneurs or workers; (iii) next,
depending on their present shocks and their access to the credit market, they will
decide if they want to become entrepreneurs or workers in the next period by
comparing their conditional expectations of the next period’s value functions; (iv)
ﬁnally, after production, households decide how much to save and consume. And
all markets clear.272 YULEI LUO ET AL.
2.1. The Household Sector
Preferences. We consider a model economy with a continuum (with the mea-














tion (note that when σ = 1,u ( c t) = logct), and β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor.
Households’ economic activities. Households are assumed to engage in two
economicactivities:productionaccordingtotheiroccupationalchoicesandwealth
accumulation. Here we assume that a ﬁxed cost to be an entrepreneur (measured
in utility units) is a ﬁxed number, which will be calibrated later, and occupational
choices cannot be reverted in the same period.
Idiosyncratic risk to labor productivity and entrepreneurial skills. Following
Aiyagari(1994),wealsoassumetheworkersfaceidiosyncraticshockstolaborefﬁ-
ciency.Eachagentisendowedwithoneunitoftime.Thisunitoftimehasstochastic
productivity as labor input, ε; it can take a value from  w = {ε1,...,ε n}, where
ε1 < ···<ε n. When ε = εn, we think of the agent as having the highest labor
productivity, and when ε = ε1, we think of him on her as having the lowest labor
productivity. The nonzero labor services can be used in his or her own business (to
be an entrepreneur) or supplied to the labor market at the competitive wage rate.
Following Quadrini (2001), we also assume that labor has the same productivity
in both activities and supplies all the services of labor in the market.
Forcomparisonwiththeshockstolaborefﬁciency,whichtakesonadditiveform,
we assume entrepreneurs also face idiosyncratic entrepreneurial risks that take a
multiplicative form and are drawn randomly from the set  e ={ θ1,...,θ N}, and
similarly we assume that θ1 < ···<θ N. Following FGC (2003), the distribution
of these two idiosyncratic shocks depends on the agent’s past shocks as well as on
occupational choicesinthelastperiod:Iftheagentwasanentrepreneur(aworker)
inthelastperiodt−1andremainsanentrepreneur(aworker)inthecurrentperiod
t,he or she will draw an entrepreneurial shock (a labor productivity shock) from a
ﬁrst-orderMarkov chain P (θt|θt−1)(Q(εt|εt−1))deﬁned on  e ( w);ifthe agent
was an entrepreneur (a worker) in the last period t − 1 and wants to be a worker
(an entrepreneur) in the current period t,he will draw a labor productivity shock
(an entrepreneurial shock) from a probability distribution   Q(εt) (  P(θ t)) deﬁned
on  w ( e).
2.2. The Production Sectors
As in Quadrini (2001) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), we have two production
sectors: the corporate sector, composed of large ﬁrms and corporations, and theRISK, MARKET IMPERFECTIONS, AND HETEROGENEITY 273
noncorporate sector, composed of entrepreneurs. The two sectors differ in their
production technologies. Suppose that entrepreneurship is formed by running
business projects, and entrepreneurs face uninsurable entrepreneurial risks and
ﬁnancial constraints. The ﬁrst factor causes the whole household wealth to be
invested in the business, and the second one makes the demand for capital of these
small ﬁrms closely dependent on the net worth of the owners.
The noncorporate sector/entrepreneur sector. The production function in the
entrepreneur sector is
y = f(θ,k,l)= θkµlω, 0 <µ+ ω<1, (2)
where θ is the entrepreneurial ability/productivity, i.e., the capacity to invest
capital productively, k the individual entrepreneurial capital, and l the labor input.
Entrepreneurs can borrow and invest capital in a technology whose return depends
on their own entrepreneurial ability. That is, those with higher ability levels have
higher average and marginal returns from investing.
The corporate sector. The corporate sector is populated by large ﬁrms with a
standard Cobb–Douglas technology,
Yc = F(K c,L c) = Kα
c L1−α
c ,
where Kc and Lc are aggregate corporate capital and labor, respectively. In equi-
librium, the interest rate and the wage rate are given by the marginal products of
each factor,
W(Kc,L c) = (1 − α)(Kc/Lc)α and R(Kc,L c) = α(Kc/Lc)α−1 − δc, (3)
respectively, where δc is the rate of depreciation in the corporate sector.
2.3. The Financial Intermediation Sector
The ﬁnancial intermediation sector in this model can collect deposits from house-
holds by paying the interest rate R and make loans to either entrepreneurs asking
for funds or the corporate sector. The lending is based on a constant-returns-to
scale technology with a proportional cost per unit of funds lent. Competition
among banks makes (i) intermediation proﬁts zero, (ii) the lending rates equal to
R forloanstothecorporatesector,and(iii)Re = R+η forloanstoentrepreneurs;
here η is the proportional cost per unit of funds faced by entrepreneurs. Based on
thedataabouthouseholdborrowingandlendingtobanksandotherintermediation
sectors in Quadrani (2001), the lending rate could be set around (0.035,0.055).
2.4. Demand for Capital and Business Proﬁts
As a result of borrowing constraints, ﬁrms cannot operate at the level that maxi-
mizestheirproﬁts.Becausehouseholdassetholdings,usedascollateral,determine274 YULEI LUO ET AL.
the tightness of these constraints, the demand for capital and labor will depend
both on shocks and on the level of asset holdings. In case the borrower does not
repay the loan with the interest, i.e., in the case of bankruptcy, the bank gets a
share 0 <κ<1 of the proﬁts of the ﬁrm. This amount can be regarded as the
quantity that the bank will get if it uses the legal system to enforce the contract. In
addition, the bank cannot seize the household’s assets. Finally, a default decision
today does not have a reputational consequence in the future. Therefore, the bank
will only lend an amount such that the ﬁrm does not have any incentive to default,
and this amount may not be the one needed by the entrepreneur to operate the ﬁrm
at an optimal level.
At the beginning of the current period, after observing the shocks, the en-
trepreneur decides his demand for inputs to maximize his proﬁts:
π(θ,a) =
max
{kt,b t,l t} {θkµlω − Wl− (Re + δe)b} (4)
s.t. : kt ≤ at + bt, (5)
π(θ,a) ≥ (1 − κ)π(θ,a)+ (1 + Re)b, (6)
where at is asset holding, bt is the quantity borrowed from banks, kt is the demand
for capital, and δe is the depreciation rate in the entrepreneurial sector. The second
equation above is the incentive compatibility constraint, which implies that the
total proﬁt an entrepreneur needs is higher than the entrepreneur’s income if he
defaults. Thus, we cannot observe any default in equilibrium. The ﬁrst term on
the right-hand side of that equation is the proﬁt that the household keeps for
itself, and the second term is the amount of payments to the ﬁnancial intermediary
because of default. Using the same procedure as in FGC (2003),3 we can solve
the above problem and derive the demand for inputs as well as the proﬁt function:
k = ke(θ,a), l = le(θ,a), and p = π(θ,a).
3. HOUSEHOLD OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS AND STEADY STATE
EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we ﬁrst present households’ optimization problems and then deﬁne
a steady state equilibrium for the economy. The optimal occupational choice and






u(c) + β max
  
vw(a ,ε ;  )Q(ε,dε ),
 
ve(a ,θ ;  )  P(dθ ) − ψ
  
(7)
s.t.:c + a  = (1 + R(Kc,L c))a + W(Kc,L c)(1 −  h)εRISK, MARKET IMPERFECTIONS, AND HETEROGENEITY 275
and a  ≥ a,where   denotes the current distribution of agents over asset holdings
and idiosyncratic shocks. The worker makes occupational choices by comparing
the conditional expectations of two value functions for being a worker and being
an entrepreneur in the next period. We denote the worker’s decision rules for
consumption and asset holdings as c = cw(a,ε) and a  = aw(a,ε), respectively.





u(c) + β max
  
vw(a ,ε ;  )  Q(dε ),
 
ve(a ,θ ;  )P(θ,dθ ) − ψ
  
(8)
s.t. :c + a  = π(θ,a)+ [1 + R(Kc,L c)]a + W(Kc,L c)(1 −  h)
and a  ≥ a, where we denote the entrepreneur’s decision rules for consump-
tion and asset holdings as c=ce(a,θ; ) and a  =ae(a,θ; ), respec-
tively. An entrepreneur will remain an entrepreneur in the next period if  
vw(a ,ε ;  )  Q(dε )<
 
ve(a ,θ ;  )P(θ,dθ )−ψ;otherwise,hewillchoose
to be a worker. Similarly, a worker will remain a worker in the next period if  
vw(a ,ε ;  )Q(ε,dε )>
 
ve(a ,θ ;  )  P(dθ ) − ψ. Deﬁne χi(a,ε,θ; ) as
the decision rules governing whether an agent stays in the same occupation. We
can use the following indicator function to specify occupational choices:
χi(a,ε,θ; ) =
 
0 if he stays in the same occupation
1 otherwise, (9)
where i = w,e.
DEFINITION. A recursive competitive equilibrium for the steady state econ-
omy is a set of decision rules, cw,c e,a w,a e,k ,l , Kc, and Lc, and a set of value
functions, vw and ve, the pricing functions, R and W,and a law of motion for the
measure of agents, H, such that
(1) The decision rules, cw and aw, and value function, vw, solve problem (7), given the
functions ve,R ,W,and H.
(2) The decision rules, ae,a e,k ,l , and value function, ve, solve problem (8), given the
functions vw,R ,W,and H.
(3) The occupational decision rule, χi, is determined by (9), given vw and ve.
(4) R and W are competitive, i.e., they are equal to the marginal productivity of capital
and labor (net of depreciation) in the corporate sector.
(5) The ﬁrms’ decision rules, k and l, solve problem (4).
(6) Prices are such that capital and labor markets clear:4
 




ld e + Lc =
 
(1 −  h)εd w. (10)
(7) The law of motion for the distribution is consistent with individual optimal behavior,
and it is invariant.276 YULEI LUO ET AL.
Although we cannot guarantee theoretically the existence and uniqueness of the
equilibriumdescribedabovebecauseofthenonconvexityprobleminthehousehold
problem, practically, existence and uniqueness do hold in this model because the
computational evidence shows that the value functions in this model are strictly
concave for all reasonable parameter choices. This conclusion, together with the




The quantitative properties of the model’s competitive equilibrium cannot be
established analytically, and they need to be studied using numerical methods.
Computing the recursive competitive equilibrium involves three steps. First, we
need to impose restrictions on the functional forms. Second, we select as many
parameters as possible either by matching long-run properties of the model econ-
omy to the U.S. data or by using previous empirical evidence. In the last step, we
need to develop a numerical algorithm to solve the competitive equilibrium up to
an arbitrarily small error. Our computational algorithm is a combination of the
ones used in FGC (2003), Young (2006), and Luo and Young (2009).5 The model
period is set to one year, which is standard in the literature. The discount factor,
β, is set together with the share of capital in the entrepreneurial sector, µ, so that
the capital–output ratio of the whole economy in the steady state is equal to 2.5.
We set α = 0.36, which is the standard choice in the literature, and µ = 0.36
and ω = 0.52 so that µ +   = 0.88 < 1.6 The implicit degree of decreasing
returns to scale (12%) generates a portion of income earned by entrepreneurs that
matches the PSID data. In our benchmark exercise, we set φ = 0. We also choose
the parameter ψ, which governs the amount of effort to be an entrepreneur, to
be 0.5. In this way, the number of entrepreneurs is around 8.6%, which matches
the number in the U.S. data (SCF and PSID). Table 1 summarizes our parameter
choices for the baseline model.
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TABLE 2. Idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity







⎦,p= [0.31 0.38 0.31]
Next, to parameterize the stochastic idiosyncratic labor productivity, we follow
Storesletten et al. (2007). They argue that the speciﬁcation of labor income for an
individual household must allow for persistent and transitory components. Based
on their empirical work from the PSID data, we specify log(yi) to be
log(yi) = ωi +  i, (11)
ω 
i = ρωi + v 
i, (12)
where  i ∼ N(0,σ2
  ) is the transitory component and ωi is the persistent com-
ponent. The innovation term associated with ωi is assumed to be distributed as
N(0,σ2
v). They estimate ρ = 0.935, σ2
  = 0.01, and σ2
v = 0.061. The uncon-




ν = 0.14051. This
processattributesabouthalftheunconditionalvariancetothepersistentcomponent
and half to the transitory component. We then approximate this process with a
three-state Markov chain, which is characterized in Table 2.
For the points in θ,we follow Quadrini (2001) and FGC (2003). Conditional on
θ1, θ2 and θ3 are set to obtain the demand for capital in the medium shock to be 10
timeslargerthanthatinthelowshockandforﬁrmsinthehighshocktobe100times
larger. Finally, θ1 is set to make the ratio of entrepreneurial wealth to total wealth
in the economy match around 0.4. In Table 3, we choose the diagonal elements in
Q to match the empirical exit and entry rates from entrepreneurship, although we
cannot reach the high exit rate as reported in the data, which is around 24%. In the
nondiagonal parts, for the low shocks, we divide the rest of the probability into
two equal numbers, 0.16 each; for the medium shock, we set them to capture the
growth of the ﬁrms; for the high shocks, we just assume they drop to the medium
level of 10%. The choice of q = [0.60 .30 .1] is motivated by Quadrini (2001),
who he chooses three bins that assign 60% of entrepreneurs to small projects, 30%
to middle-sized projects, and 10% to large projects, respectively.
TABLE 3. Idiosyncratic shocks to entrepreneurial activity
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FIGURE 1. The demand for capital.
4.2. Baseline Results
As in FGC (2003), our model with endogenously determined interest and wage
rates also predicts that the ﬁrms are always constrained in their ﬁnancial decisions
in the range of asset holdings where the measure of households is positive. It
is obvious that entrepreneurs can borrow more from outside and operate more
proﬁtably if their own asset holdings are high. Figure 1 shows the constrained
demand for capital. The difference between the demand for capital and the 45◦
line is the amount they can borrow from banks. It clearly shows that the higher
the wealth holdings of the entrepreneurs, the higher the capital they demand. That
is, they will run larger projects. Figure 2 shows that the level of proﬁts increases
with asset holdings until the ﬁrm can operate at the optimum level.
The value functions for workers and entrepreneurs are plotted in Figures 3
and 4, respectively. Theoretically, it is obvious that occupational choices of the
households may make the value functions nonconcave, because an individual
cannot be half an entrepreneur and half a worker. However, these two ﬁgures show
that the value functions for workers and entrepreneurs are both strictly concave.
This ﬁnding is robust for any set of our parameter choices, and is consistent with
that obtained in Gomes et al. (2001) and FGC (2003). Theoretical departures from
concavity are not a serious problem.
Another important question in the literature about entrepreneurship is who
prefers to be an entrepreneur and run his own projects. As in FGC (2003), we also
ﬁnd that those households with asset holdings in the middle of the distribution are
most likely to become entrepreneurs, because they can borrow enough capital andRISK, MARKET IMPERFECTIONS, AND HETEROGENEITY 279













FIGURE 2. The proﬁts.
run more proﬁtable projects, whereas households with low asset holdings prefer
to be workers because they cannot borrow enough capital due to the borrowing
constraints. In contrast, for households with high levels of asset holdings, running











FIGURE 3. Worker’s value function.280 YULEI LUO ET AL.














FIGURE 4. Entrepreneur’s value function.
their own businesses is not very attractive because they can earn enough interest
income from their own assets. Furthermore, our model also predicts that the
percentage of workers is much larger than that of entrepreneurs, and most workers
hold assets less than 5, whereas most entrepreneurs hold assets less than 20.
That is, uninsurable idiosyncratic risks and capital market imperfections make
households that want to become entrepreneurs accumulate large wealth.
4.3. Implications of Entrepreneurial Risk on Wealth Inequality and
Aggregate Activity
Figure 5 clearly shows how our model can generate a skewed wealth distribution.
Compared with the Aiyagari model, our benchmark model can ﬁt the data much
better. In our model, the top 1%, 5%, and 10% of agents hold 22%, 49%, and 63%
of wealth, respectively; these numbers are quite similar to those reported from the
U.S.data(26%,47%,and60%,respectively).Aswediscussedabove,itisdifﬁcult
to estimate or calibrate the stochastic process of entrepreneurial risk because of
the lack of good micro data. Therefore, to examine the effects of entrepreneurial
risk on both the wealth distribution and aggregate activity, we assume that the
entrepreneurial risk follows an AR(1) process. Hence, in this section, we just
study how the changes in the volatility of entrepreneurial risk affect the economy
instead of trying to match the data perfectly. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the
entrepreneurial shock follows an AR(1) process,
θ 
i − θ = ρe(θi − θ)+ ζi, (13)RISK, MARKET IMPERFECTIONS, AND HETEROGENEITY 281




































FIGURE 5. The Lorenz curves for wealth.
where θ = 1.55, ρe = 0.65, and ζi ∼ N(0,σ2
ζ ).7 We then approximate this
process with a three-state Markov chain as we did before.
Table 4 and Figure 6 provide a summary of the effects of the entrepreneurial
risks on aggregate quantities and wealth inequality. The table shows that in the
economy with uninsurable entrepreneurial risks, both entrepreneurial capital and
aggregate capital increase with the volatility of the entrepreneurial shock because
of the precautionary savings motive and borrowing constraints. This mechanism
ofwealthaccumulationissimilartotheoneintheBewley–Aiyagarieconomies.In
addition, the equilibrium interest rate is decreasing with σ2
ζ as the entrepreneurial
risk also increases the ratio Kc/Lc. It is shown in a one-sector growth model of
Angeletos and Calvet (2006) that idiosyncratic production shocks introduce a risk
premium on private capital and reduce the demand for investment. Our model
tells another story. In our setup, although the introduction of entrepreneurial risks
reduces the demand for the investment in the entrepreneur sector because of a
TABLE 4. The aggregate effects of uninsurable entrepreneurial risks
σζ KK e Kc/Lc Ye Yc # of entrep. RW
0.14 1.380 0.176 4.225 0.117 0.482 6.0% 0.087 1.075
0.16 1.554 0.304 5.169 0.207 0.441 9.6% 0.069 1.157
0.18 1.688 0.642 10.684 0.454 0.233 17.8% 0.021 1.511282 YULEI LUO ET AL.





































FIGURE 6. The Lorenz curves for wealth.
risk premium on private capital, the effect of the precautionary savings motive
dominates. Therefore, the economy with higher volatility may be characterized by
higher entrepreneurial capital due to the net effect of precautionary savings, a risk
premium of private capital, a lower risk-free rate, and higher aggregate capital due
to the reallocation of capital and labor in the two sectors. Table 4 also shows that
the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy is increasing with σ2
ζ . The intuition
is simple: entrepreneurs with higher wealth levels can borrow more funds and
run more proﬁtable projects; in this case choosing to be an entrepreneur becomes
more attractive. Furthermore, the economy with high volatility of entrepreneurial
riskswillgenerate greater wealth inequalities. Figure 6plots the Lorenz curves for
differentvolatilities.Ourmodel’spredictionisveryintuitive:fortheeconomywith
high volatility, the entrepreneurs hit by a sequence of good shocks will become
wealthier and those hit by a sequence of bad shocks will keep losing and then have
to close their own businesses and become workers.
4.4. Effects of Imperfect Enforcements
In this section, we examine the impacts of contract enforcements on the economy
by adjusting the appropriability factor κ. This factor may also be a measure of
the degree of ﬁnancial development in the equilibrium. Based on the number
reported by Moddy’s investors’ service, we set κ = 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, respectively.
All other parameters are the same as those used in the baseline model. Table 5
summarizes the main effects of κ, i.e., the tightness of the borrowing constraints,RISK, MARKET IMPERFECTIONS, AND HETEROGENEITY 283
TABLE 5. The aggregate effects of contract enforcements
κKK e Kc/Lc Ye Yc # of entrep. R Gini
0.41 .912 0.820 7.690 0.422 0.300 8.23% 0.039 0.638
0.61 .961 0.932 8.366 0.473 0.268 9.53% 0.035 0.635
0.81 .973 1.023 8.716 0.512 0.240 10.3% 0.033 0.627
onaggregatequantitiesandcross-sectionalproperties.Thistableshowsthat,when
κ increases,i.e.,theborrowingconstraintsbecometight,bothK andKe goup.The
intuition behind this result is simple: in the economy with an high appropriability
factor, in equilibrium, where no default is observed, entrepreneurs could borrow
more capital and employ more labor, and then run more proﬁtable projects and
produce more output in the entrepreneurial sector. Furthermore, more workers
with higher levels of asset holdings would choose to be entrepreneurs. This effect
can slightly reduce the wealth inequalities in the economy because more people
become entrepreneurs, and more entrepreneurs become even richer.
5. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents and solves a heterogeneous-agent general equilibrium model
with occupational choices, uninsurable idiosyncratic labor and entrepreneurial
risks, and incomplete markets including both the absence of a state-contingent
market for idiosyncratic risks and credit market imperfections. We demonstrate in
this model that introducing entrepreneurial risks and capital market imperfections
can substantially increase the wealth inequalities and thus provide a better match
with the U.S. data. We also demonstrate that uninsurable entrepreneurial risk can
increase aggregate entrepreneurial capital stock because of precautionary motives
and borrowing constraints.
NOTES
1. This number is taken from Budr´ ıa et al. (2001); the data used are from the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF), 1998 wave. Previous estimates using different waves of the SCF are quite similar to
this number.
2. For a detailed discussion of the successes and failures of these models in accounting for wealth
inequality, see a survey by Quadrini and R´ ıos-Rull (1997).
3. We thank Fernandez-Villaverde for sharing with us his Matlab code for solving the demand
functions.
4. Note that the left-hand side of the capital market (labor market) equation is the aggregate capital
(labor) demand in the entrepreneurial sector and the corporate sector, and the right-hand side is the
aggregate capital (labor) supply from all agents. We also assume here that entrepreneurs do not use
their own labor in production activity.
5. It is available from the corresponding author by request.
6. Note that the production function in the corporate sector is the standard Cobb–Douglas one,
whereas the one in the entrepreneurial sector is strictly decreasing returns to scale.
7. Changing the values of θ and ρe does not change our main results reported in Table 4.284 YULEI LUO ET AL.
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